

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04753 01 OF 02 171002Z  
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00  
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10  
L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 EUR-12 SAA-01 SES-02  
SSM-03 /079 W

-----116204 171010Z /11

O R 170729Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9262  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 4753

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: UN, MARR, LE, IS, SY  
SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON: REMARKS OF UNIFIL COMMANDER ERSKINE  
AND UN AMBASSADOR TUEINI

1. SUMMARY. AT LUNCH ON AUGUST 16, UNIFIL COMMANDER ERSKINE SAID THAT ONLY ABOUT 150 LEBANESE SOLDIERS REMAINED AT KAWKABA, THE REST HAVING WITHDRAWN NORTH. HE SAW NO POINT IN MOVING LEBANESE SOLDIERS EITHER TO TIBNIN OR SRIFA AT THE PRESENT TIME. GHASSAN TUEINI, WHO JOINED DISCUSSION AFTER LUNCH, MADE CLEAR QUESTION WAS ACADEMIC AT MOMENT ANYWAY. GOL WAS GOING TO SIT TIGHT FOR NOW, LEAVING THE 150 SOLDIERS AT KAWKABA AND MAKING NO NEW DEPLOYMENTS, WHILE IT ATTEMPTED TO SEE IT SOME BROADER, MORE COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION COULD BE WORKED OUT. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR,DCM AND EMBOFF LUNCHEd AUGUST 16 HERE WITH ERSKINE, AIME, AND LOCAL U.N. REP SAUNDERS. GHASSAN TUEINI

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04753 01 OF 02 171002Z

JOINED DISCUSSION DURING COFFEE AFTERWARDS. ERSKINE, WHO HAD ATTENDED MEETING THAT MORNING WITH BOUTROS, KHOURY, TUEINI AND CUQ, SAID THE FOLLOWING.

3. COMMENTS OF ERSKINE.

A. ONLY ABOUT 150 LEBANESE SOLDIERS REMAINED IN

KAWKABA (SEE ALSO JERUSALEM 2264). THE REMAINING 450 HAD WITHDRAWN NORTH TO ABLAH AND RASHAYYA AL WADI ON AUGUST 12 AND 13. THIS REDEPLOYMENT HAD HELPED CALM CONSIDERABLY THE FEARS OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS, THUS REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THEY WOULD SHELL KAWKABA AGAIN.

B. BEN GAL HAD TOLD ERSKINE THAT THE MILITIAS WERE LIKELY TO FIRE ON HELICOPTERS TRYING TO TRANSPORT LEBANESE TROOPS TO TIBNIN. MOREOVER, MILITIAS WERE LIKELY TO SHELL TIBNIN AFTER THE LEBANESE ARRIVED THERE. BEN GAL HAD INDICATED THAT RISKS IN PROCEEDING TO SARIFA WERE CONSIDERABLY LESS, ALTHOUGH ISRAELIS COULD MAKE NO GUARANTEES. ERSKINE BELIEVED HELICOPTERS COULD SAFELY TRANSPORT LEBANESE COMPANY TO SRIFA BY PICKING IT UP EITHER AT ABLAH OR RASHAYYA AL WADI, THEN FLYING OUT THE COAST, MOVING SOUTH OVER THE SEA AND THEN TURNING WEST DIRECTLY INTO SRIFA. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SRIFA REMAINED WITHIN RANGE OF CHRISTIAN 155'S, WHICH COULD FIRE ABOUT 19,000 METERS.

C. GIVEN REDUCTION IN TENSION, HOWEVER, THERE WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE ANY NEED FOR THE LEBANESE TO DEPLOY EITHER TO SRIFA OR TO TIBNIN INsofar AS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF UNIFIL'S MISSION WAS CONCERNED. LEBANESE PRESENCE IN EITHER AREA WOULD NOT SERVE TO CARRY OUT 425'S INJUNCTION  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04753 01 OF 02 171002Z

TO UNIFIL TO HELP LEBANESE RESTORE THEIR AUTHORITY IN THE AREA.

D. UNIFIL COULD HANDLE MECHANICS OF TRANSPORTING TROOPS BY HELICOPTER TO EITHER TIBNIN OR SRIFA. UNIFIL HAD FOUR HUEY'S AND TWO ALOUETTES. FOUR HUEY'S ALONE COULD TRANSPORT 24 PEOPLE PER LIFT AND THUS MAKE MOVEMENT IN FIVE LIFTS. REFUELING CAPABILITY WAS AVAILABLE AT NAQURAH.

E. ERSKINE COMPLAINED THAT LEBANESE HAD MISLED UNIFIL, EVEN WHEN UNIFIL WAS TRYING TO STAND UP FOR THEIR INTERESTS. UNIFIL HAD OBTAINED RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT DESPITE LEBANESE DENIALS TO CONTRARY, ORIGINAL BATTALION WAS ACTUALLY SUPPOSED TO SERVE AS FRAMEWORK FOR FULL BRIGADE, AND LEBANESE DID INTEND TO DROP OFF SOLDIERS IN MARJAYUN. (WE QUESTION THIS.)

F. THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF UNIFIL ESTABLISHING A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER PRESENCE IN THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVES OR OF LEBANESE ARMY ENTERING ENCLAVES AS LONG AS THE SYRIAN ARMY REMAINED IN LEBANON. IF THE SYRIANS WITHDREW,

HOWEVER, ISRAELIS AND CHRISTIANS MIGHT ACQUIESCE IN SUCH  
A PRESENCE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04753 02 OF 02 171003Z  
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00  
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10  
L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 EUR-12 SAA-01 SES-02  
SSM-03 /079 W

-----116260 171010Z /11

O R 170729Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9263  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
USMISSION NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4753

4. COMMENTS OF TUEINI.

A. GHASSAN TUEINI INDICATED QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT  
TO TIBNIN OR SRIFA WAS ACADEMIC. HE HAD JUST COME FROM  
MEETING WITH SARKIS, WHO HAD DECIDED GOL SHOULD SIT TIGHT  
FOR NOW--KEEPING THE PRESENT 150 SOLDIERS IN KAWKABA, BUT  
MAKING NO FURTHER TROOPS MOVEMENTS.

B. DURING THIS TIME, TUEINI SAID, LEBANESE WOULD LOOK  
FOR SOME WAY OF ARRIVING AT MORE COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO  
PROBLEM. GOL WOULD MAKE THREE-PRONGED APPROACH IN THIS  
REGARD: WITH UN IN NEW YORK, WITH UNIFIL AND WITH U.S.  
LEBANON HAD, HOWEVER, NO PRESENT DESIRE TO CALL FOR SPECIAL  
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND EVEN HOPED TO AVOID DEBATE  
DURING SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING FOR RENEWAL OF UNIFIL'S  
MANDATE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04753 02 OF 02 171003Z

C. TUEINI, IN TERMS SIMILAR TO ERSKINE, QUESTIONED WHETHER MOVEMENT TO TIBNIN OR SRIFA UNDER PRESENT RATHER HUMILIATING CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD SERVE ANY PURPOSE AND WHETHER IT WOULD HELP RESTORE LEBANESE AUTHORITY IN SOUTH LEBANON IT MIGHT HAVE SEVERE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS BOTH IN LEBANON AND WITH LEBANON'S ARAB FRIENDS. TUEINI SAID LEBANESE HAD BUTTED UP AGAINST FIRM ISRAELI DECISION NOT TO ALLOW LEBANESE OR U.N. INTO ENCLAVES. HE WARNED THAT UNLESS SOMEONE COULD "TALK SOME SENSE INTO THE ISRAELIS", LEBANON WAS GOING TO FACE GRAVE DOMESTIC CRISIS.

D. TUEINI ALSO SAID THAT GOL HAD MADE DECISION ON AUGUST 15 TO CUT OFF SALARIES OF HADDAD AND SHIADIC. AT MORNING MEETING CUQ HAD PRESENTED PROPOSITION THAT GOL SHOULD PAY HADDAD. TUEINI HAD TOLD CUQ THAT THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE, AND THAT UNIFIL SHOULD HAVE TOLD ISRAELIS SO.

E. TUEINI TOLD AMBASSADOR AFTER OTHERS HAD LEFT THAT CUQ AT MORNING MEETING HAD PROPOSED FERRYING TROOPS TO NAQURAH BY HELICOPTER AND USING BUSES FROM THERE TO SRIFA. AS NOTED ABOVE, HOWEVER, ERSKINE AT LUNCH SAID HELICOPTERS WOULD TRANSPORT TROOPS DIRECTLY TO SRIFA. (COMMENT. SUCH CHANGES MAKE LEBANESE VERY SCEPTICAL OF WHOLE ARRANGEMENT AND ARE ONE REASON THEY HAVE DECIDED TO SIT TIGHT.)  
PARKER

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MILITARY PLANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 17 aug 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978BEIRUT04753  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780336-0198  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** BEIRUT  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780851/aaaabpyx.tel  
**Line Count:** 200  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 6c037061-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION NEA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 27 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1702558  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SOUTH LEBANON: REMARKS OF UNIFIL COMMANDER ERSKINE AND UN AMBASSADOR TUEINI  
**TAGS:** MARR, LE, IS, SY, UN, UNIFIL, (ERSKINE, EMMANUEAL A), (TUEINI, GHASSAN)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/6c037061-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014